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Jerman v. Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich LPA et al.
Docket No. 08-1200
Argument Date: January 13, 2010
From: The Sixth Circuit
by Ralph C. Anzivino
Marquette University Law School
CASE AT A GLANCE 
The Fair Debt Collections Practices Act requires a debt collector to send a validation notice to a debtor that 
provides an opportunity for the debtor to challenge the validity of the debt. In this case the debt collector 
served the debtor with a validation notice and required the debtor to challenge the validity of the debt in 
writing, albeit the FDCPA is silent on the means of challenge. Upon a finding of a violation of the FDCPA, the 
debt collector raised the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense to the mistake of law. 
F A I R  D E B T  P R A C T I C E S  A C T
Does the “Bona Fide” Error Defense of the Fair Debt Collection  
Practices Act Include Mistakes of Law?
ISSUE
Do a debt collector’s legal errors qualify for the “bona fide” error 
defense under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA)?
FACTS
Respondents are an Ohio law firm concentrating in real estate and 
foreclosure law and an associate attorney at the firm. They were 
retained by Countrywide Home Loans, which held the mortgage 
on petitioner Karen L. Jerman’s home. In April 2006, they filed a 
complaint in state court to foreclose on the house. Three days later, 
respondents served Jerman with both the complaint and, as required 
by the FDCPA, a validation notice informing her of her legal rights. 
Under the act, the validation notice must include a statement that 
unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, 
disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will 
be assumed to be valid by the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)
(3). By its terms, the provision does not require that the dispute be 
made in writing. Nevertheless, respondents’ notice informed Jerman 
that her debt would be presumed valid unless disputed “in writing.” 
After receiving the notice, she hired an attorney, who wrote a letter 
disputing the debt. In response, Countrywide checked its records and 
discovered that Jerman had fully repaid her mortgage. Respondents 
then dismissed their state-court complaint.
Jerman subsequently filed a suit in federal court, alleging a violation 
of § 1692g(a)(3) of the FDCPA. Her amended complaint sought actual 
and statutory damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and class 
certification. Respondents moved to dismiss on the basis that their 
notice complied with the act. The district court denied the motion, 
finding that the notice violated the FDCPA because it required Jerman 
to dispute the alleged debt in writing even though the act imposed no 
such restriction.
Under the FDCPA, debt collectors may avoid liability if they can estab-
lish either of two defenses. First, a “safe harbor” defense carves out 
an exemption for any act done or omitted in good faith in conformity 
with any advisory opinion of the Federal Trade Commission. Second, a 
“bona fide error” defense exempts debt collectors from liability if they 
prove that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona 
fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid any such error.
Respondents moved for summary judgment asserting the bona fide 
error defense. They argued that although they fully intended to notify 
Jerman that she was required to dispute the debt in writing, the 
resulting FDCPA violation was not “intentional” within the meaning 
of the bona fide error defense because they honestly misunderstood 
what the act required. Moreover, they argued, their law firm main-
tained procedures reasonably adapted to avoid such legal errors, 
including among other things designating one of the firm’s principals 
to take the lead in FDCPA compliance, sending him to continuing edu-
cation classes on the act, and subscribing to relevant legal periodicals. 
The district court agreed and entered summary judgment for the law 
firm.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. The court noted that Congress 
originally borrowed the language of the FDCPA’s bona fide error 
defense from the Truth in Lending Act (TILA). Three years after the 
passage of the FDCPA, Congress amended TILA to expressly provide 
that “an error of legal judgment with respect to a person’s obligations 
under TILA is not a bona fide error.” As a result, the Sixth Circuit 
concluded that the amendment indicated that, unlike TILA, Congress 
did not intend to limit the FDCPA’s defense to clerical errors. On June 
29, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
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CASE ANALYSIS
Petitioner Jerman asserts that interpreting the FDCPA to provide 
a defense for mistakes of law is inconsistent with the text to the 
statute. In order to qualify for the bona fide error defense, the viola-
tion must not be intentional and the actor must have maintained 
procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. Petitioner 
posits that to say that a “violation” of the law “was not intentional” 
could mean one of two things. It could mean that the defendant did 
not intend to commit the act that violated the statute. Alternatively, it 
could mean that a defendant knew exactly what she was doing but did 
not realize that her intentional act would violate the statute. Mistakes 
of law could find shelter in the bona fide error defense only under the 
second interpretation. In this case, for example, the respondents do 
not contest that they intended to include in their letter the language 
that violates the act. They argue only that their conduct, although 
intentional, did not constitute an intentional violation of the statute.
Jerman argues that the language of the bona fide error defense must 
be understood in light of the familiar legal maxim that ignorance 
of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally. 
The general rule that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no 
defense to criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal 
system. Of course, Congress occasionally departs from this standard 
rule, but exceptions are rare. The most common examples are found 
in criminal statutes that limit punishment to those who violate the 
law knowing its requirements. But the bona fide error defense applies 
to civil not criminal claims, and it does not simply limit penalties 
and remedies. It provides a defense to any liability. It is exceedingly 
rare—indeed, as far as petitioner can tell, completely unprecedent-
ed—for Congress to make ignorance of the law a complete defense 
to all liability in the civil context. Statutory references to intentional 
conduct, or even intentional violations, are best understood to refer 
to defendants’ intentions with respect to their actions, not to their 
intention to disobey a known legal duty. At the very least, they estab-
lish that the phrase does not unambiguously demonstrate Congress’s 
intent to make an exception to the venerable principle that ignorance 
of the law is no defense.
She contends that had Congress intended to provide a defense for 
mistakes of law, it would have used different language in § 1692k(c). 
When Congress intends to refer to defendants who know their 
conduct is unlawful, it generally uses the word “willful” rather than 
“intentional.” It is unlikely that in enacting the FDCPA, Congress 
used the work “intentional” intending for courts to give it the mean-
ing traditionally reserved for the word “willful.” In fact, the origins of 
the bona fide error defense belie any such suggestions. The language 
of the defense originated in the Truth in Lending Act, which unlike 
the FDCPA, contains both a civil private right of action and criminal 
penalties. Under TILA, the bona fide error defense applies to those 
who do not violate the act intentionally, and the criminal provision 
applies only to those who “willfully and knowingly” fail to comply with 
the act.
This distinction between “intentional” violations on the one hand 
and “willful and knowing” violations on the other is consistent 
with the ordinary legal use of those terms. Willful violations, being 
the most culpable because undertaken with knowledge of the act’s 
requirements, are subject to the severe sanction of criminal penal-
ties. On the other end of the spectrum, truly unintentional violations 
where the lender did not intend to commit the act that violates the 
statute qualify for a complete defense. It should come as no surprise, 
therefore, that by the time Congress enacted the FDCPA, every court 
of appeals to have considered the question had rejected the view that 
TILA’s bona fide error defense excused mistakes of law. The inescap-
able conclusion is that under TILA a mistake of law was a defense to 
criminal charges but did not fall within the bona fide error defense to 
civil liability. Because Congress adopted the FDCPA’s bona fide error 
defense verbatim from TILA, it is presumed to have intended the 
same limitation on the scope of the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense 
as well.
Jerman also maintains that in addition to requiring that the defen-
dant’s violation be unintentional, the act provides a defense only if 
the defendant has maintained, “procedures reasonably adapted to 
avoid any such error.” The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that “it is more 
common to speak of procedures adapted to avoid clerical errors than 
to speak of procedures adapted to avoid mistakes of law.” Indeed, the 
difficulty of applying the act’s reasonable procedures requirement to 
legal errors provides a significant reason to conclude Congress did not 
intend courts to attempt it. There are any numbers of ways in which 
clerical and other nonlegal errors may lead to unintended violations of 
the statute. On the other hand, courts that have extended the defense 
to legal errors have struggled to define just what constitutes a proce-
dure reasonably adapted to avoid misinterpreting the law. Moreover, 
applying the reasonable procedures requirement to legal errors is 
not only difficult, but it puts federal courts (or even lay juries) in the 
awkward position of having to establish standards for the professional 
conduct of attorneys, an area traditionally left to the states. Jerman 
reasons that the Supreme Court should not adopt a construction of 
the act that would “alter the existing balance of federal and state pow-
ers” “absent a clear indication of Congress’ intent” to do so.
Petitioner further argues that allowing a mistake of law defense 
renders the advisory opinion process ineffective, and the safe harbor 
defense superfluous. Congress provided a “safe harbor” defense, un-
der which debt collectors are immune from liability for “any act done 
or omitted in good faith” in conformity with any advisory opinion of 
the Commission. Recognizing a defense for mistakes of law conflicts 
with this provision in two ways. First, it is unlikely that Congress 
would have intended courts to force an awkward fit between legal 
errors and the bona fide error defense when it had already provided 
a more direct solution to the same problem. Second, the court of ap-
peals’ decision renders the safe harbor defense superfluous. Under 
that decision, every application of the safe harbor defense is already 
covered by the bona fide error provision. The Supreme Court has long 
expressed a deep reluctance to interpret a statutory provision so as to 
render superfluous other provisions in the same enactment. Here, the 
bona fide error and safe harbor defenses may easily be harmonized, 
the former addressing nonlegal errors and the latter addressing errors 
of legal judgment.
Jerman also asserts that excusing legal errors would undermine 
the FDCPA’s deterrent effect. Congress was well aware that the debt 
collection market—which generally compensates collectors by giving 
them a percentage of the money collected—establishes an economic 
incentive for aggressive, misleading, and even abusive practices. 
Excusing mistakes of law conflicts with Congress’s intent to ensure 
that those debt collectors who refrain from abusive debt collection 
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practices are not competitively disadvantaged. As between similarly 
situated debt collectors, all having procedures reasonably designed to 
avoid legal errors, the Sixth Circuit’s decision provides a competitive 
advantage to the collectors who take the more aggressive, but incor-
rect, view of the law. That result is not only unfair to the law-abiding 
collectors, but creates a race to the bottom that will leave the field 
to collectors with the fewest scruples. This is exactly what Congress 
intended the FDCPA to prevent.
Petitioner also maintains that debt collectors can be protected from 
unfair liability without excusing their mistakes of law. Congress 
has provided debt collectors with special protections in the form of a 
defense for violations based on nonlegal errors, and an easy and cost-
effective way to obtain expert advice on the meaning of the act that 
will shield them from liability so long as they follow it. Moreover, like 
all others expected to comply with the sometimes uncertain require-
ments of the law, debt collectors can mitigate the risk of liability 
through careful study of the law, reliance on forms and procedures 
developed by expert bodies, and by forgoing practices of questionable 
lawfulness. It does not seem unfair to require that one who delib-
erately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct must 
assume the risk that he or she may cross the line. The statute already 
provides debt collectors with considerably more protection than other 
businesses subject to federal regulation enjoy. If more is required, it 
must be sought from Congress rather than this Court.
Finally, petitioner argues that the Sixth Circuit misconstrued the 
intent and effect of the 1980 amendment to TILA. The Sixth Circuit 
placed significant weight on the fact that in 1980 Congress amended 
that law to declare expressly that legal mistakes do not qualify as 
bona fide errors under that statute’s defense, but it made no such 
amendment to the FDCPA. The court concluded that the fact that the 
TILA’s bona fide error provision expressly excludes legal errors while 
the analogous provision in the FDCPA does not have such limitation 
suggests that, unlike TILA, Congress did not intend to preclude legal 
mistakes from protection under the FDCPA. In Jerman’s view, the 
court drew the wrong inference from the amendment. It assumed 
that the 1980 amendment was meant to change, rather than codify, 
existing law as it pertained to legal mistakes. But there is no basis for 
that assumption. Congress included its reference to legal errors not to 
change the law, but rather to make clear that although other portions 
of the 1980 amendment may have expanded the scope of the defense, 
Congress did not intend to go so far as to make ignorance of the law 
an excuse. In 1980, there was no need to change the meaning of the 
TILA to exclude legal mistakes—at that time, every court of appeals 
to have construed the defense had already held that mistakes of law 
were not covered. Moreover, Congress would have had every reason 
to believe that those decisions were correct, and that as enacted, 
the statute already excluded mistakes of law. Accordingly, the more 
plausible inference is that Congress intended its reference to legal 
mistakes to codify the existing consensus.
For their part, the respondents assert that the plain text of the FDCPA 
requires that legal errors be included in the bona fide error defense. A 
growing majority of federal courts have concluded that nothing in the 
FDCPA limits the reach of the defense to clerical errors only. In fact, 
respondents say they are unaware of a single decision that excludes 
legal errors from the bona fide error defense based on an analysis of 
the plain text of the statute. The Supreme Court has long recognized 
that the preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires courts 
to presume that the legislature says in a statute what it means and 
means in a statute what it says. Thus, when interpreting language 
used by Congress in the absence of statutory definitions, courts 
construe words in accordance with their ordinary and natural mean-
ings, in context, and with a view of their place in the overall statutory 
scheme. Consequently, it is well established that when the statute’s 
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least when the 
disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it accord-
ing to its terms.
Section 1692k(c) is an affirmative defense requiring debt collectors to 
prove that their “violation” of the FDCPA was (1) not intentional and 
(2) resulted from a bona fide error (3) notwithstanding the mainte-
nance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. The 
debt collector must only show that the violation was unintentional, 
not that the communication itself was unintentional. As commonly 
used, violation means “[t]he act or an instance of violating or the 
condition of being violated.” Synonyms include breach, infraction, 
transgression, trespass, and infringement. Thus, the common meaning 
of violation encompasses not only the “act” constituting an infrac-
tion, but also the actual “condition being violated,” i.e., the infraction 
or violation itself.
The respondents argue that when viewed in the context of the plain 
language of the FDCPA, the bona fide error defense does not restrict 
the phrase “violation was not intentional” to an “act” constituting the 
violation of the statute. A review of the FDCPA’s safe harbor provision 
at § 1692k(e) reveals that when Congress intended to limit applica-
tion of a defense to an “act,” it specifically did so. Had Congress 
intended to limit the bona fide error defense to an unintentional  
“act or omission,” it could have used language consistent with  
§ 1692k(e). Congress did not use the term act in § 1692k(c), but 
rather violation.
Respondents posit that the plain language of the bona fide error de-
fense does not exculpate debt collectors who are ignorant of the law. 
Jerman, on the other hand, argues that the statutory phrase “violation 
was not intentional” must be restricted to “acts” constituting an in-
fraction of the law, based on the criminal law maxim that “ignorance 
of the law is no defense.” Petitioner, they say, relies on this argument 
in order to inject a meaning into the bona fide error defense that 
is otherwise not apparent from the actual text. Her reliance on this 
criminal law maxim is unpersuasive, the respondents contend, be-
cause it is predicted on a false premise—that the respondents’ error 
in legal judgment was the result of “ignorance of the law.” They con-
tend that this characterization of their legal violation is absurd. The 
conduct found to be in violation of the FDCPA (the issuance of a letter 
requiring a response “in writing) was predicated upon a reasonable 
analysis of existing case law in an effort to comply with the statute.
Importantly, the bona fide error defense is not an exception to the 
criminal law maxim that “ignorance of the law is no defense.” 
Although this affirmative defense includes legal errors, it excludes 
ignorance as a basis for establishing the defense. In ordinary English, 
ignorance means “[t]he condition of being uneducated, unaware, 
or uninformed.” While ignorance may be asserted to establish that a 
legal error was unintentional under the bona fide error defense, by 
its very definition, ignorance would prove that a debt collector did not 
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act in good faith or maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid 
any such error. Thus the district court did not find that respondents 
were ignorant of the law. Rather, it found just the opposite—that 
respondents had knowledge and awareness of existing case law. 
Stated differently, respondents’ contend that their violation of the 
statute was subjectively found to be unintentional because they relied 
on existing case law. In addition, their reliance was objectively found 
to be made in good faith while maintaining procedures reasonably 
adapted to avoid any such error. There is, they say, no factual basis to 
assert “ignorance of the law” is involved in this case.
Respondents believe that a plain reading of the bona fide error de-
fense does not render the FDCPA’s safe harbor provision ineffective or 
superfluous. Petitioner Jerman broadly characterizes the safe harbor 
provision as a means for a debt collector to obtain clarification about 
the FDCPA’s meaning and application, where legal uncertainty puts 
debt collectors at risk for liability. In the respondents’ view, however, 
her suggestion that an advisory opinion is available for all situations 
involving “legal uncertainty” is overstated. The “practicability” of 
obtaining an advisory opinion from the FTC is highly questionable, 
especially in situations in which a lawyer is engaged to initiate 
litigation and a delay in obtaining an opinion could impact a statute 
of limitations or otherwise adversely compromise a client’s rights. 
Obtaining an advisory opinion would also be especially troublesome 
in situations such as foreclosures where time is of the essence and 
any delay in litigation could result in the value of collateral being 
substantial impaired.
This “practicability” is also impacted by the FTC’s internal rule that it 
issue advisory opinions only when there is “no clear Commission or 
court precedent.” Given this requirement, it is understandable that 
the FTC would be reluctant to issue an advisory opinion when there 
is existing case law. Finally, Jerman’s characterization of the alleged 
broad remedy available under the safe harbor provision ignores the 
undeniable complexity of the meaning and application of the FDCPA. 
This legislation contains few definitions and is applied without the 
benefit of governing administrative rules and regulations. As a result, 
there has been litigation on virtually every aspect of the act. Com-
mon sense dictates that the bona fide error and safe harbor defenses 
are not incompatible and superfluous but rather can and should be 
construed to work hand-in-hand.
Respondents believe that the bona fide error defense is consistent 
with the purpose of the FDCPA to balance the rights of ethical debt 
collectors and consumers. Notwithstanding the remedial purpose 
of the FDCPA, Congress was also sensitive to the rights of ethical 
debt collectors. Congress expressly acknowledged that an important 
purpose of the FDCPA was to eliminate abusive debt collection prac-
tices while not competitively disadvantaging ethical debt collectors. 
If Congress meant what it said—that ethical debt collectors warrant 
protection—it is the petitioner who is asking the Court to disrupt 
the balance struck in the FDCPA. Respondents’ conduct was respon-
sible, conservatively based on case law, and unquestionably ethical. 
The bona fide error defense does not, as Jerman argues, undermine 
the statute’s deterrent effect, nor will it create a race to the bottom 
that will leave the field to collectors with the fewest scruples. Peti-
tioner’s assertion that the Sixth Circuit’s decision will embolden debt 
collectors to act unethically in a “race to the bottom” ignores the 
serious financial penalties contained in the FDCPA under the civil 
and administrative provisions. Indeed, her fear that the floodgates 
will be opened to unscrupulous debt collectors has not materialized. 
Since the Sixth Circuit’s decision in this case, respondents have 
found twenty-one cases in which federal courts have considered the 
bona fide error defense as applied to legal errors. Seven courts denied 
the defense as a matter of law, eleven found issues of fact, and three 
granted summary judgment for the debt collector.
Respondents argue that if legal errors are removed from the bona fide 
error defense, lawyers will face potential liability to nonclients for the 
exercise of their professional judgment. A lawyer’s potential liability 
under the FDCPA will generally be a consequence of claimed legal er-
ror. Thus, Jerman’s proposal to restrict the bona fide error defense to 
exclude legal errors essentially removes the conduct of lawyers from 
the ambit of the bona fide error defense—leaving them with no pro-
tection from liability for even the most unintentional and good faith 
errors in professional judgment. This is tantamount to congressional 
control of attorney advocacy under the FDCPA, subjecting even the 
most ethical attorneys to lawsuits by nonclients for exercising profes-
sional judgment. Most states recognize a litigation privilege that 
generally shields an attorney from a third-party claim arising from 
litigation activities. Petitioner’s attempt to remove the vast majority 
of attorney errors from the bona fide error defense would necessarily 
drive a wedge between debt collection lawyers and their clients.
Respondents also argue that TILA does not warrant setting aside the 
plain meaning of the FDCPA. In this regard, they say, petitioner’s 
analogy to the bona fide error defense in TILA is flawed. Jerman 
argues that § 1692k(c) excludes legal errors because (1) Congress 
“borrowed” the language from TILA’s then current bona fide error 
defense when it enacted the FDCPA and (2) Congress understood 
the allegedly “settled” interpretation of the pre-1980 TILA defense to 
exclude legal errors. 
The respondents contend there are a number of problems with this 
argument. First, it wrongly assumes that when Congress utilizes 
language from an existing statute in a new statute, there is a 
presumption that Congress intended to adopt the existing judicial 
interpretations of that language. On the contrary, the respondents 
say, the Supreme Court has recognized several factors that must be 
considered in determining whether Congress intended to adopt exist-
ing judicial interpretations. These include (1) whether the judicial 
interpretations are settled and (2) whether congressional intent has 
been expressed in the legislative history or stated purpose of the 
statute. Regarding the first factor, respondents argue, the judicial 
interpretation of TILA’s bona fide error defense was unsettled: the Su-
preme Court had never reviewed the language petitioner claims was 
lifted from the pre-1980 version of TILA and inserted into the FDCPA, 
nor was there a consensus among the lower courts. As to the second 
factor, Congress did not express an intent in the FDCPA’s legislative 
history to adopt any particular judicial interpretation of TILA’s bona 
fide error defense.
When enacting the FDCPA, Congress did not indicate that the bona 
fide error defense should be construed consistent with any interpreta-
tions of TILA. In fact, the legislative histories of TILA and the FDCPA 
are significantly different. The legislative history of TILA reflects 
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Congress’s inclusion of the bona fide error defense in response to 
complaints from creditors that clerical errors would be inevitable 
due to the complexity of mathematical computations. Conversely, the 
legislative history of the FDCPA shows that Congress granted more 
expansive protection, stating that a debt collector has no liability if 
he violates the act in any manner, including with regard to the act’s 
coverage, when such violation is unintentional and occurred despite 
procedures designed to avoid such violations. The fact that Congress 
chose not to amend the FDCPA to exclude legal errors—despite hav-
ing amended the statute several times—defeats any attempt to draw 
parallels between the defenses now. The legislative history of the 
FDCPA does not evidence a restricted congressional intent to adopt 
TILA’s bona fide error defense.
Respondents further maintain that the express purpose of the 
FDCPA demonstrates that Congress did not intend to adopt TILA’s 
more limited bona fide error defense. Finding that there has been a 
congressional adoption of judicial interpretation is only appropriate 
when analyzing statutes with the same or similar objectives. In this 
case, however, the purposes of TILA and the FDCPA are fundamentally 
different. The purpose of TILA is exclusively to protect consumers 
through “a meaningful disclosure of credit terms.” The FDCPA, on 
the other hand, was drafted to balance the purposes of (1) eliminat-
ing abusive debt collecting practices while (2) not competitively 
disadvantaging nonabusive debt collectors. These differing legislative 
purposes support the inclusion of legal errors within the FDCPA’s 
bona fide error defense. While TILA provides creditors with several 
avenues to avoid liability for legal errors, the FDCPA does not. If legal 
mistakes are removed from the plain language of the FDCPA’s bona 
fide error defense, ethical debt collectors will be left with only the safe 
harbor defense which, as already demonstrated, is often impracticable 
or unavailable. Therefore, to give effect to the FDCPA’s express pur-
poses of balancing the interests of both consumers and ethical debt 
collectors, legal errors cannot be removed from the plain language of 
the bona fide error defense. 
Finally, the respondents add that the 1980 TILA amendments do not 
support a restrictive interpretation of the FDCPA’s bona fide er-
ror defense either. Congress amended TILA to remove legal errors 
concerning the act’s coverage from protection. The FDCPA was not so 
amended despite Congress having had the opportunity to do so on  
numerous occasions. Petitioner’s assertion that the 1980 amend-
ments demonstrate a congressional intent to exclude legal errors from 
the FDCPA’s bona fide error defense presumes that in all likelihood, 
the issue never occurred to Congress. Congress’s failure to amend 
§ 1692k(c) since 1980, however, leads to the opposite conclusion. In 
1986, Congress did amend the FDCPA to repeal the exemption for 
attorneys. In 1995, the Supreme Court highlighted the “clerical versus 
legal error’ debate in Heintz v. Jenkins, 514 U.S. 291, when it held that 
lawyers are liable under the FDCPA as debt collectors. Since Heintz, 
the vast majority of circuit and district courts have determined that  
§ 1692k(c) is not limited to clerical errors.
Nevertheless, Congress has remained silent on this issue. It is recog-
nized that when Congress had abundant opportunity to give further 
expression of its will, the failure to do so amounts to legislative 
approval and ratification of the construction given the statutes by the 
courts. These principles of statutory construction are especially appli-
cable when, as in this case, the statute has undergone amendments. 
Thus, the respondents contend, petitioner’s assertion that Congress 
forgot to amend the FDCPA is unpersuasive. In their view, the fact 
that Congress did not amend the bona fide error defense in the  
FDCPA to exclude legal mistake on eight occasions since the 1980 
TILA amendments signifies its ratification and approval of the con-
struction placed upon § 1692k(c) by a growing majority of courts.
SIGNIFICANCE
While both parties agree that the outcome of this case will have a ma-
jor impact on debt collection law and practice, they disagree sharply 
as to what the effect will be.
From petitioner Karen L. Jerman’s perspective, extending the bona 
fide error defense to legal errors would undermine Congress’s efforts 
to deter abusive collection practices. Allowing this defense to suit 
would encourage debt collectors to take an aggressive view of the law 
when its requirements are not clear, knowing that there will be no 
liability if they cross the line into illegal conduct.
From the respondent law firm’s point of view as debt collectors, 
however, requiring collectors to prove the three elements of the bona 
fide error defense by a preponderance of the evidence will protect 
consumers from unethical collectors, but failing to extend the defense 
to legal errors at all would undermined the congressional intent to 
equitably balance the valid interests of both consumers and ethical 
debt collectors. 
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In Support of Respondents Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich 
LPA et al.
ACA	International	(Michael	A.	Klutho,	612.333.3000)
American	Legal	and	Financial	Network	(Andrew	C.	Morganstern,	
516.741.2585)
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California	Association	of	Collectors	(Ronald	A.	Zumbrun,	
916.486.5900)
Commercial	Law	League	of	America	and	DBA	International	(Manuel	
H.	Newburger,	512.476.9103)
DRI	-	Voice	of	the	Defense	Bar	(Linda	T.	Coberly,	312.558.5600)
Mississippi	Creditors’	Attorneys	Association	(Lester	F.	Smith,	
601.853.8851)
National	Association	of	Retail	Collection	Attorneys	(Seth	P.	Waxman,	
202.663.6000)
Ohio	Creditor’s	Attorneys	Association	et	al.	(Michael	D.	Slodov,	
216.623.0000)
USFN	-	America’s	Mortgage	Banking	Attorneys	(Rick	D.	DeBlasis,	
513.412.6614)
